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formal mathematics

  • 1 formal mathematics

    Большой англо-русский и русско-английский словарь > formal mathematics

  • 2 formal mathematics

    Универсальный англо-русский словарь > formal mathematics

  • 3 formal mathematics

    English-Russian scientific dictionary > formal mathematics

  • 4 mathematics

    English-Russian scientific dictionary > mathematics

  • 5 formal languages

    முறையமைவு மொழிகள்

    English-Tamil dictionary > formal languages

  • 6 formal position

    பதவி நிலை

    English-Tamil dictionary > formal position

  • 7 Formal System

       Common to both logical positivism and transformational linguistics is their view of language-as-mathematics. Both focus on language as a system of primitive or elementary units which can be combined according to fixed rules. However useful this analogy may be in certain limited ways, it creates problems in understanding how the purely formal system of elements and rules relates to something other than itself. Both create dualistic systems which oppose formal linguistic competence to empirical components. (Tyler, 1978, pp. 13-14)

    Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Formal System

  • 8 formal

    I
    வழமையான, கொண்டாட்டமான
    II
    முறைபடி, முறையாக, சரியாக
    முறைப்படியான; முறைசார்ந்த
    IV
    விதிமுறை பின்பற்றுகிற
    V
    முறையான, ஒழுங்குமுறை
    VI
    முறையான
    முறைசார் / முறைப்படி
    விதிமுறை
    IX
    முறைமையான
    X
    வழமையான
    XI
    கொண்டாட்டமான
    முறைபடி
    முறையாக
    சரியாக

    English-Tamil dictionary > formal

  • 9 формальная математика

    Большой англо-русский и русско-английский словарь > формальная математика

  • 10 Artificial Intelligence

       In my opinion, none of [these programs] does even remote justice to the complexity of human mental processes. Unlike men, "artificially intelligent" programs tend to be single minded, undistractable, and unemotional. (Neisser, 1967, p. 9)
       Future progress in [artificial intelligence] will depend on the development of both practical and theoretical knowledge.... As regards theoretical knowledge, some have sought a unified theory of artificial intelligence. My view is that artificial intelligence is (or soon will be) an engineering discipline since its primary goal is to build things. (Nilsson, 1971, pp. vii-viii)
       Most workers in AI [artificial intelligence] research and in related fields confess to a pronounced feeling of disappointment in what has been achieved in the last 25 years. Workers entered the field around 1950, and even around 1960, with high hopes that are very far from being realized in 1972. In no part of the field have the discoveries made so far produced the major impact that was then promised.... In the meantime, claims and predictions regarding the potential results of AI research had been publicized which went even farther than the expectations of the majority of workers in the field, whose embarrassments have been added to by the lamentable failure of such inflated predictions....
       When able and respected scientists write in letters to the present author that AI, the major goal of computing science, represents "another step in the general process of evolution"; that possibilities in the 1980s include an all-purpose intelligence on a human-scale knowledge base; that awe-inspiring possibilities suggest themselves based on machine intelligence exceeding human intelligence by the year 2000 [one has the right to be skeptical]. (Lighthill, 1972, p. 17)
       4) Just as Astronomy Succeeded Astrology, the Discovery of Intellectual Processes in Machines Should Lead to a Science, Eventually
       Just as astronomy succeeded astrology, following Kepler's discovery of planetary regularities, the discoveries of these many principles in empirical explorations on intellectual processes in machines should lead to a science, eventually. (Minsky & Papert, 1973, p. 11)
       Many problems arise in experiments on machine intelligence because things obvious to any person are not represented in any program. One can pull with a string, but one cannot push with one.... Simple facts like these caused serious problems when Charniak attempted to extend Bobrow's "Student" program to more realistic applications, and they have not been faced up to until now. (Minsky & Papert, 1973, p. 77)
       What do we mean by [a symbolic] "description"? We do not mean to suggest that our descriptions must be made of strings of ordinary language words (although they might be). The simplest kind of description is a structure in which some features of a situation are represented by single ("primitive") symbols, and relations between those features are represented by other symbols-or by other features of the way the description is put together. (Minsky & Papert, 1973, p. 11)
       [AI is] the use of computer programs and programming techniques to cast light on the principles of intelligence in general and human thought in particular. (Boden, 1977, p. 5)
       The word you look for and hardly ever see in the early AI literature is the word knowledge. They didn't believe you have to know anything, you could always rework it all.... In fact 1967 is the turning point in my mind when there was enough feeling that the old ideas of general principles had to go.... I came up with an argument for what I called the primacy of expertise, and at the time I called the other guys the generalists. (Moses, quoted in McCorduck, 1979, pp. 228-229)
       9) Artificial Intelligence Is Psychology in a Particularly Pure and Abstract Form
       The basic idea of cognitive science is that intelligent beings are semantic engines-in other words, automatic formal systems with interpretations under which they consistently make sense. We can now see why this includes psychology and artificial intelligence on a more or less equal footing: people and intelligent computers (if and when there are any) turn out to be merely different manifestations of the same underlying phenomenon. Moreover, with universal hardware, any semantic engine can in principle be formally imitated by a computer if only the right program can be found. And that will guarantee semantic imitation as well, since (given the appropriate formal behavior) the semantics is "taking care of itself" anyway. Thus we also see why, from this perspective, artificial intelligence can be regarded as psychology in a particularly pure and abstract form. The same fundamental structures are under investigation, but in AI, all the relevant parameters are under direct experimental control (in the programming), without any messy physiology or ethics to get in the way. (Haugeland, 1981b, p. 31)
       There are many different kinds of reasoning one might imagine:
        Formal reasoning involves the syntactic manipulation of data structures to deduce new ones following prespecified rules of inference. Mathematical logic is the archetypical formal representation. Procedural reasoning uses simulation to answer questions and solve problems. When we use a program to answer What is the sum of 3 and 4? it uses, or "runs," a procedural model of arithmetic. Reasoning by analogy seems to be a very natural mode of thought for humans but, so far, difficult to accomplish in AI programs. The idea is that when you ask the question Can robins fly? the system might reason that "robins are like sparrows, and I know that sparrows can fly, so robins probably can fly."
        Generalization and abstraction are also natural reasoning process for humans that are difficult to pin down well enough to implement in a program. If one knows that Robins have wings, that Sparrows have wings, and that Blue jays have wings, eventually one will believe that All birds have wings. This capability may be at the core of most human learning, but it has not yet become a useful technique in AI.... Meta- level reasoning is demonstrated by the way one answers the question What is Paul Newman's telephone number? You might reason that "if I knew Paul Newman's number, I would know that I knew it, because it is a notable fact." This involves using "knowledge about what you know," in particular, about the extent of your knowledge and about the importance of certain facts. Recent research in psychology and AI indicates that meta-level reasoning may play a central role in human cognitive processing. (Barr & Feigenbaum, 1981, pp. 146-147)
       Suffice it to say that programs already exist that can do things-or, at the very least, appear to be beginning to do things-which ill-informed critics have asserted a priori to be impossible. Examples include: perceiving in a holistic as opposed to an atomistic way; using language creatively; translating sensibly from one language to another by way of a language-neutral semantic representation; planning acts in a broad and sketchy fashion, the details being decided only in execution; distinguishing between different species of emotional reaction according to the psychological context of the subject. (Boden, 1981, p. 33)
       Can the synthesis of Man and Machine ever be stable, or will the purely organic component become such a hindrance that it has to be discarded? If this eventually happens-and I have... good reasons for thinking that it must-we have nothing to regret and certainly nothing to fear. (Clarke, 1984, p. 243)
       The thesis of GOFAI... is not that the processes underlying intelligence can be described symbolically... but that they are symbolic. (Haugeland, 1985, p. 113)
        14) Artificial Intelligence Provides a Useful Approach to Psychological and Psychiatric Theory Formation
       It is all very well formulating psychological and psychiatric theories verbally but, when using natural language (even technical jargon), it is difficult to recognise when a theory is complete; oversights are all too easily made, gaps too readily left. This is a point which is generally recognised to be true and it is for precisely this reason that the behavioural sciences attempt to follow the natural sciences in using "classical" mathematics as a more rigorous descriptive language. However, it is an unfortunate fact that, with a few notable exceptions, there has been a marked lack of success in this application. It is my belief that a different approach-a different mathematics-is needed, and that AI provides just this approach. (Hand, quoted in Hand, 1985, pp. 6-7)
       We might distinguish among four kinds of AI.
       Research of this kind involves building and programming computers to perform tasks which, to paraphrase Marvin Minsky, would require intelligence if they were done by us. Researchers in nonpsychological AI make no claims whatsoever about the psychological realism of their programs or the devices they build, that is, about whether or not computers perform tasks as humans do.
       Research here is guided by the view that the computer is a useful tool in the study of mind. In particular, we can write computer programs or build devices that simulate alleged psychological processes in humans and then test our predictions about how the alleged processes work. We can weave these programs and devices together with other programs and devices that simulate different alleged mental processes and thereby test the degree to which the AI system as a whole simulates human mentality. According to weak psychological AI, working with computer models is a way of refining and testing hypotheses about processes that are allegedly realized in human minds.
    ... According to this view, our minds are computers and therefore can be duplicated by other computers. Sherry Turkle writes that the "real ambition is of mythic proportions, making a general purpose intelligence, a mind." (Turkle, 1984, p. 240) The authors of a major text announce that "the ultimate goal of AI research is to build a person or, more humbly, an animal." (Charniak & McDermott, 1985, p. 7)
       Research in this field, like strong psychological AI, takes seriously the functionalist view that mentality can be realized in many different types of physical devices. Suprapsychological AI, however, accuses strong psychological AI of being chauvinisticof being only interested in human intelligence! Suprapsychological AI claims to be interested in all the conceivable ways intelligence can be realized. (Flanagan, 1991, pp. 241-242)
        16) Determination of Relevance of Rules in Particular Contexts
       Even if the [rules] were stored in a context-free form the computer still couldn't use them. To do that the computer requires rules enabling it to draw on just those [ rules] which are relevant in each particular context. Determination of relevance will have to be based on further facts and rules, but the question will again arise as to which facts and rules are relevant for making each particular determination. One could always invoke further facts and rules to answer this question, but of course these must be only the relevant ones. And so it goes. It seems that AI workers will never be able to get started here unless they can settle the problem of relevance beforehand by cataloguing types of context and listing just those facts which are relevant in each. (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1986, p. 80)
       Perhaps the single most important idea to artificial intelligence is that there is no fundamental difference between form and content, that meaning can be captured in a set of symbols such as a semantic net. (G. Johnson, 1986, p. 250)
        18) The Assumption That the Mind Is a Formal System
       Artificial intelligence is based on the assumption that the mind can be described as some kind of formal system manipulating symbols that stand for things in the world. Thus it doesn't matter what the brain is made of, or what it uses for tokens in the great game of thinking. Using an equivalent set of tokens and rules, we can do thinking with a digital computer, just as we can play chess using cups, salt and pepper shakers, knives, forks, and spoons. Using the right software, one system (the mind) can be mapped into the other (the computer). (G. Johnson, 1986, p. 250)
        19) A Statement of the Primary and Secondary Purposes of Artificial Intelligence
       The primary goal of Artificial Intelligence is to make machines smarter.
       The secondary goals of Artificial Intelligence are to understand what intelligence is (the Nobel laureate purpose) and to make machines more useful (the entrepreneurial purpose). (Winston, 1987, p. 1)
       The theoretical ideas of older branches of engineering are captured in the language of mathematics. We contend that mathematical logic provides the basis for theory in AI. Although many computer scientists already count logic as fundamental to computer science in general, we put forward an even stronger form of the logic-is-important argument....
       AI deals mainly with the problem of representing and using declarative (as opposed to procedural) knowledge. Declarative knowledge is the kind that is expressed as sentences, and AI needs a language in which to state these sentences. Because the languages in which this knowledge usually is originally captured (natural languages such as English) are not suitable for computer representations, some other language with the appropriate properties must be used. It turns out, we think, that the appropriate properties include at least those that have been uppermost in the minds of logicians in their development of logical languages such as the predicate calculus. Thus, we think that any language for expressing knowledge in AI systems must be at least as expressive as the first-order predicate calculus. (Genesereth & Nilsson, 1987, p. viii)
        21) Perceptual Structures Can Be Represented as Lists of Elementary Propositions
       In artificial intelligence studies, perceptual structures are represented as assemblages of description lists, the elementary components of which are propositions asserting that certain relations hold among elements. (Chase & Simon, 1988, p. 490)
       Artificial intelligence (AI) is sometimes defined as the study of how to build and/or program computers to enable them to do the sorts of things that minds can do. Some of these things are commonly regarded as requiring intelligence: offering a medical diagnosis and/or prescription, giving legal or scientific advice, proving theorems in logic or mathematics. Others are not, because they can be done by all normal adults irrespective of educational background (and sometimes by non-human animals too), and typically involve no conscious control: seeing things in sunlight and shadows, finding a path through cluttered terrain, fitting pegs into holes, speaking one's own native tongue, and using one's common sense. Because it covers AI research dealing with both these classes of mental capacity, this definition is preferable to one describing AI as making computers do "things that would require intelligence if done by people." However, it presupposes that computers could do what minds can do, that they might really diagnose, advise, infer, and understand. One could avoid this problematic assumption (and also side-step questions about whether computers do things in the same way as we do) by defining AI instead as "the development of computers whose observable performance has features which in humans we would attribute to mental processes." This bland characterization would be acceptable to some AI workers, especially amongst those focusing on the production of technological tools for commercial purposes. But many others would favour a more controversial definition, seeing AI as the science of intelligence in general-or, more accurately, as the intellectual core of cognitive science. As such, its goal is to provide a systematic theory that can explain (and perhaps enable us to replicate) both the general categories of intentionality and the diverse psychological capacities grounded in them. (Boden, 1990b, pp. 1-2)
       Because the ability to store data somewhat corresponds to what we call memory in human beings, and because the ability to follow logical procedures somewhat corresponds to what we call reasoning in human beings, many members of the cult have concluded that what computers do somewhat corresponds to what we call thinking. It is no great difficulty to persuade the general public of that conclusion since computers process data very fast in small spaces well below the level of visibility; they do not look like other machines when they are at work. They seem to be running along as smoothly and silently as the brain does when it remembers and reasons and thinks. On the other hand, those who design and build computers know exactly how the machines are working down in the hidden depths of their semiconductors. Computers can be taken apart, scrutinized, and put back together. Their activities can be tracked, analyzed, measured, and thus clearly understood-which is far from possible with the brain. This gives rise to the tempting assumption on the part of the builders and designers that computers can tell us something about brains, indeed, that the computer can serve as a model of the mind, which then comes to be seen as some manner of information processing machine, and possibly not as good at the job as the machine. (Roszak, 1994, pp. xiv-xv)
       The inner workings of the human mind are far more intricate than the most complicated systems of modern technology. Researchers in the field of artificial intelligence have been attempting to develop programs that will enable computers to display intelligent behavior. Although this field has been an active one for more than thirty-five years and has had many notable successes, AI researchers still do not know how to create a program that matches human intelligence. No existing program can recall facts, solve problems, reason, learn, and process language with human facility. This lack of success has occurred not because computers are inferior to human brains but rather because we do not yet know in sufficient detail how intelligence is organized in the brain. (Anderson, 1995, p. 2)

    Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Artificial Intelligence

  • 11 Language

       Philosophy is written in that great book, the universe, which is always open, right before our eyes. But one cannot understand this book without first learning to understand the language and to know the characters in which it is written. It is written in the language of mathematics, and the characters are triangles, circles, and other figures. Without these, one cannot understand a single word of it, and just wanders in a dark labyrinth. (Galileo, 1990, p. 232)
       It never happens that it [a nonhuman animal] arranges its speech in various ways in order to reply appropriately to everything that may be said in its presence, as even the lowest type of man can do. (Descartes, 1970a, p. 116)
       It is a very remarkable fact that there are none so depraved and stupid, without even excepting idiots, that they cannot arrange different words together, forming of them a statement by which they make known their thoughts; while, on the other hand, there is no other animal, however perfect and fortunately circumstanced it may be, which can do the same. (Descartes, 1967, p. 116)
       Human beings do not live in the object world alone, nor alone in the world of social activity as ordinarily understood, but are very much at the mercy of the particular language which has become the medium of expression for their society. It is quite an illusion to imagine that one adjusts to reality essentially without the use of language and that language is merely an incidental means of solving specific problems of communication or reflection. The fact of the matter is that the "real world" is to a large extent unconsciously built on the language habits of the group.... We see and hear and otherwise experience very largely as we do because the language habits of our community predispose certain choices of interpretation. (Sapir, 1921, p. 75)
       It powerfully conditions all our thinking about social problems and processes.... No two languages are ever sufficiently similar to be considered as representing the same social reality. The worlds in which different societies live are distinct worlds, not merely the same worlds with different labels attached. (Sapir, 1985, p. 162)
       [A list of language games, not meant to be exhaustive:]
       Giving orders, and obeying them- Describing the appearance of an object, or giving its measurements- Constructing an object from a description (a drawing)Reporting an eventSpeculating about an eventForming and testing a hypothesisPresenting the results of an experiment in tables and diagramsMaking up a story; and reading itPlay actingSinging catchesGuessing riddlesMaking a joke; and telling it
       Solving a problem in practical arithmeticTranslating from one language into another
       LANGUAGE Asking, thanking, cursing, greeting, and praying-. (Wittgenstein, 1953, Pt. I, No. 23, pp. 11 e-12 e)
       We dissect nature along lines laid down by our native languages.... The world is presented in a kaleidoscopic flux of impressions which has to be organized by our minds-and this means largely by the linguistic systems in our minds.... No individual is free to describe nature with absolute impartiality but is constrained to certain modes of interpretation even while he thinks himself most free. (Whorf, 1956, pp. 153, 213-214)
       We dissect nature along the lines laid down by our native languages.
       The categories and types that we isolate from the world of phenomena we do not find there because they stare every observer in the face; on the contrary, the world is presented in a kaleidoscopic flux of impressions which has to be organized by our minds-and this means largely by the linguistic systems in our minds.... We are thus introduced to a new principle of relativity, which holds that all observers are not led by the same physical evidence to the same picture of the universe, unless their linguistic backgrounds are similar or can in some way be calibrated. (Whorf, 1956, pp. 213-214)
       9) The Forms of a Person's Thoughts Are Controlled by Unperceived Patterns of His Own Language
       The forms of a person's thoughts are controlled by inexorable laws of pattern of which he is unconscious. These patterns are the unperceived intricate systematizations of his own language-shown readily enough by a candid comparison and contrast with other languages, especially those of a different linguistic family. (Whorf, 1956, p. 252)
       It has come to be commonly held that many utterances which look like statements are either not intended at all, or only intended in part, to record or impart straightforward information about the facts.... Many traditional philosophical perplexities have arisen through a mistake-the mistake of taking as straightforward statements of fact utterances which are either (in interesting non-grammatical ways) nonsensical or else intended as something quite different. (Austin, 1962, pp. 2-3)
       In general, one might define a complex of semantic components connected by logical constants as a concept. The dictionary of a language is then a system of concepts in which a phonological form and certain syntactic and morphological characteristics are assigned to each concept. This system of concepts is structured by several types of relations. It is supplemented, furthermore, by redundancy or implicational rules..., representing general properties of the whole system of concepts.... At least a relevant part of these general rules is not bound to particular languages, but represents presumably universal structures of natural languages. They are not learned, but are rather a part of the human ability to acquire an arbitrary natural language. (Bierwisch, 1970, pp. 171-172)
       In studying the evolution of mind, we cannot guess to what extent there are physically possible alternatives to, say, transformational generative grammar, for an organism meeting certain other physical conditions characteristic of humans. Conceivably, there are none-or very few-in which case talk about evolution of the language capacity is beside the point. (Chomsky, 1972, p. 98)
       [It is] truth value rather than syntactic well-formedness that chiefly governs explicit verbal reinforcement by parents-which renders mildly paradoxical the fact that the usual product of such a training schedule is an adult whose speech is highly grammatical but not notably truthful. (R. O. Brown, 1973, p. 330)
       he conceptual base is responsible for formally representing the concepts underlying an utterance.... A given word in a language may or may not have one or more concepts underlying it.... On the sentential level, the utterances of a given language are encoded within a syntactic structure of that language. The basic construction of the sentential level is the sentence.
       The next highest level... is the conceptual level. We call the basic construction of this level the conceptualization. A conceptualization consists of concepts and certain relations among those concepts. We can consider that both levels exist at the same point in time and that for any unit on one level, some corresponding realizate exists on the other level. This realizate may be null or extremely complex.... Conceptualizations may relate to other conceptualizations by nesting or other specified relationships. (Schank, 1973, pp. 191-192)
       The mathematics of multi-dimensional interactive spaces and lattices, the projection of "computer behavior" on to possible models of cerebral functions, the theoretical and mechanical investigation of artificial intelligence, are producing a stream of sophisticated, often suggestive ideas.
       But it is, I believe, fair to say that nothing put forward until now in either theoretic design or mechanical mimicry comes even remotely in reach of the most rudimentary linguistic realities. (Steiner, 1975, p. 284)
       The step from the simple tool to the master tool, a tool to make tools (what we would now call a machine tool), seems to me indeed to parallel the final step to human language, which I call reconstitution. It expresses in a practical and social context the same understanding of hierarchy, and shows the same analysis by function as a basis for synthesis. (Bronowski, 1977, pp. 127-128)
        t is the language donn eґ in which we conduct our lives.... We have no other. And the danger is that formal linguistic models, in their loosely argued analogy with the axiomatic structure of the mathematical sciences, may block perception.... It is quite conceivable that, in language, continuous induction from simple, elemental units to more complex, realistic forms is not justified. The extent and formal "undecidability" of context-and every linguistic particle above the level of the phoneme is context-bound-may make it impossible, except in the most abstract, meta-linguistic sense, to pass from "pro-verbs," "kernals," or "deep deep structures" to actual speech. (Steiner, 1975, pp. 111-113)
       A higher-level formal language is an abstract machine. (Weizenbaum, 1976, p. 113)
       Jakobson sees metaphor and metonymy as the characteristic modes of binarily opposed polarities which between them underpin the two-fold process of selection and combination by which linguistic signs are formed.... Thus messages are constructed, as Saussure said, by a combination of a "horizontal" movement, which combines words together, and a "vertical" movement, which selects the particular words from the available inventory or "inner storehouse" of the language. The combinative (or syntagmatic) process manifests itself in contiguity (one word being placed next to another) and its mode is metonymic. The selective (or associative) process manifests itself in similarity (one word or concept being "like" another) and its mode is metaphoric. The "opposition" of metaphor and metonymy therefore may be said to represent in effect the essence of the total opposition between the synchronic mode of language (its immediate, coexistent, "vertical" relationships) and its diachronic mode (its sequential, successive, lineal progressive relationships). (Hawkes, 1977, pp. 77-78)
       It is striking that the layered structure that man has given to language constantly reappears in his analyses of nature. (Bronowski, 1977, p. 121)
       First, [an ideal intertheoretic reduction] provides us with a set of rules"correspondence rules" or "bridge laws," as the standard vernacular has it-which effect a mapping of the terms of the old theory (T o) onto a subset of the expressions of the new or reducing theory (T n). These rules guide the application of those selected expressions of T n in the following way: we are free to make singular applications of their correspondencerule doppelgangers in T o....
       Second, and equally important, a successful reduction ideally has the outcome that, under the term mapping effected by the correspondence rules, the central principles of T o (those of semantic and systematic importance) are mapped onto general sentences of T n that are theorems of Tn. (P. Churchland, 1979, p. 81)
       If non-linguistic factors must be included in grammar: beliefs, attitudes, etc. [this would] amount to a rejection of the initial idealization of language as an object of study. A priori such a move cannot be ruled out, but it must be empirically motivated. If it proves to be correct, I would conclude that language is a chaos that is not worth studying.... Note that the question is not whether beliefs or attitudes, and so on, play a role in linguistic behavior and linguistic judgments... [but rather] whether distinct cognitive structures can be identified, which interact in the real use of language and linguistic judgments, the grammatical system being one of these. (Chomsky, 1979, pp. 140, 152-153)
        23) Language Is Inevitably Influenced by Specific Contexts of Human Interaction
       Language cannot be studied in isolation from the investigation of "rationality." It cannot afford to neglect our everyday assumptions concerning the total behavior of a reasonable person.... An integrational linguistics must recognize that human beings inhabit a communicational space which is not neatly compartmentalized into language and nonlanguage.... It renounces in advance the possibility of setting up systems of forms and meanings which will "account for" a central core of linguistic behavior irrespective of the situation and communicational purposes involved. (Harris, 1981, p. 165)
       By innate [linguistic knowledge], Chomsky simply means "genetically programmed." He does not literally think that children are born with language in their heads ready to be spoken. He merely claims that a "blueprint is there, which is brought into use when the child reaches a certain point in her general development. With the help of this blueprint, she analyzes the language she hears around her more readily than she would if she were totally unprepared for the strange gabbling sounds which emerge from human mouths. (Aitchison, 1987, p. 31)
       Looking at ourselves from the computer viewpoint, we cannot avoid seeing that natural language is our most important "programming language." This means that a vast portion of our knowledge and activity is, for us, best communicated and understood in our natural language.... One could say that natural language was our first great original artifact and, since, as we increasingly realize, languages are machines, so natural language, with our brains to run it, was our primal invention of the universal computer. One could say this except for the sneaking suspicion that language isn't something we invented but something we became, not something we constructed but something in which we created, and recreated, ourselves. (Leiber, 1991, p. 8)

    Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Language

  • 12 mean

    mean [mi:n]
    avare1 (a) méchant1 (b) moyen1 (d) miteux1 (f) milieu2 (a) moyenne2 (b) vouloir dire3 (a), 3 (b), 3 (e) signifier3 (c) compter3 (d) avoir l'intention3 (f) être censé3 (g), 3 (h)
    (pt & pp meant [ment])
    (a) (miserly) avare, mesquin;
    he's mean with his money il est près de ses sous;
    they're very mean about pay rises ils accordent les augmentations de salaire au compte-gouttes;
    to be mean with one's praise être avare de compliments
    (b) (nasty, unkind) méchant;
    don't be mean to your sister! ne sois pas méchant avec ta sœur!;
    go on, don't be mean! allez, ne sois pas vache!;
    he has a mean streak il peut être méchant quand il veut;
    to play a mean trick on sb jouer un sale tour à qn;
    I feel mean about not inviting her j'ai un peu honte de ne pas l'avoir invitée;
    that's mean of her ce n'est pas chic de sa part;
    American familiar he gets mean after a few drinks il devient mauvais ou méchant après quelques verres ;
    American familiar the sky was a mean shade of gray le ciel était d'une méchante couleur grise ;
    American familiar mean weather sale temps m
    the meanest intelligence l'esprit m le plus borné;
    he's no mean architect/guitarist c'est un architecte/guitariste de talent;
    it was no mean feat ce n'était pas un mince exploit
    (d) (average) moyen
    (e) familiar (excellent) super, génial;
    she's a mean chess player elle joue super bien aux échecs, elle touche sa bille aux échecs;
    he makes a mean curry il fait super bien le curry;
    she plays a mean guitar elle joue super bien de la guitare, elle touche sa bille à la guitare
    (f) (shabby) miteux, misérable;
    mean slums taudis mpl misérables
    of mean birth de basse extraction
    to feel mean ne pas se sentir dans son assiette
    2 noun
    (a) (middle point) milieu m, moyen terme m;
    the golden or happy mean le juste milieu
    (b) Mathematics moyenne f
    (a) (signify → of word, gesture) vouloir dire, signifier; (→ of person) vouloir dire;
    what is meant by…? que veut dire…?;
    what does this term mean? que signifie ou que veut dire ce terme?;
    what do you mean? qu'est-ce que tu veux dire?;
    how do you mean? qu'entendez-vous par là?;
    what do you mean by that? qu'entendez-vous par là?;
    what do you mean by "wrong"? qu'entendez-vous par "faux"?;
    what do you mean you don't like the cinema? comment ça, vous n'aimez pas le cinéma?;
    do you mean or you mean it's over already? tu veux dire que c'est déjà fini?;
    what, take them to court, you mean? tu veux dire les traîner en justice?;
    what, me?, I don't know what you mean! qui moi?, je ne vois pas ce que vous voulez dire!;
    the name means nothing to me ce nom ne me dit rien;
    does the name Heathcliff mean anything to you? est-ce que le nom de Heathcliff vous dit quelque chose?;
    that was when the word "friendship" still meant something c'était à l'époque où le mot "amitié" avait encore un sens;
    that doesn't mean a thing! ça ne veut (strictement) rien dire!
    (b) (giving clarification, speaking sincerely)
    when he says early afternoon he really means around four quand il dit en début d'après-midi, il veut dire vers quatre heures;
    do you mean it? tu es sérieux?;
    do you mean him? c'est de lui que tu parles?;
    I didn't mean that ce n'est pas ce que je voulais dire;
    you don't mean it! vous voulez rire!, vous plaisantez!;
    I mean it je parle sérieusement;
    she always says what she means elle dit toujours ce qu'elle pense;
    I'll never speak to you again, I mean it or I mean what I say je ne t'adresserai plus jamais la parole, je suis sérieux;
    I want to see him now, and I mean now! je veux le voir tout de suite, et quand je dis tout de suite, c'est tout de suite!;
    I mean (that is to say) je veux dire;
    I was with Barry, I mean Harry j'étais avec Barry, je veux dire Harry;
    why diet? I mean, you're not exactly fat pourquoi te mettre au régime? on ne peut pas dire que tu sois grosse;
    I know what you mean! (I quite agree) et comment!;
    I mean to say… ce que je veux dire c'est…;
    do you mean to tell me…? est-ce que tu es en train de me dire que…?
    (c) (imply, entail → of event, change) signifier;
    this means war/the end of our relationship c'est la guerre/la fin de notre amitié;
    this will mean more unemployment ça veut dire ou signifie qu'il y aura une augmentation du chômage;
    going to see a film means driving into town pour voir un film, nous sommes obligés de prendre la voiture et d'aller en ville;
    it would mean the children having to change school again cela signifierait que les enfants devraient changer d'école une fois de plus;
    does that mean we shouldn't wait for him? est-ce que cela veut dire ou signifie que nous ne devrions pas l'attendre?;
    just because you've been to university doesn't mean you know everything ce n'est pas parce que tu es allé à l'université que tu sais tout;
    it doesn't mean we have to stop seeing each other ça ne veut pas dire que nous devons cesser de nous voir;
    she's never known what it means to be loved elle n'a jamais su ce que c'est que d'être aimée
    (d) (matter, be of value) compter;
    this watch means a lot to me je suis très attaché à cette montre;
    your friendship means a lot to her votre amitié compte beaucoup pour elle;
    doesn't your daughter's education mean anything to you? est-ce que l'éducation de ta fille ne t'intéresse pas?;
    you mean everything to me tu es tout pour moi;
    he means nothing to me il n'est rien pour moi;
    I can't tell you what this means to me je ne peux pas te dire ce que ça représente pour moi;
    $20 means a lot to me 20 dollars, c'est une grosse somme ou c'est beaucoup d'argent pour moi;
    my Sundays mean a lot to me le dimanche est sacré pour moi;
    my independence means a lot to me mon indépendance est sacrée pour moi
    do you mean us? tu veux dire nous?;
    it was you she meant when she said that c'était à vous qu'elle pensait ou qu'elle faisait allusion quand elle a dit ça
    to mean to do sth avoir (bien) l'intention de faire qch, (bien) compter faire qch, vouloir faire qch;
    what do you mean to do? que comptez-vous faire?, qu'est-ce que vous avez l'intention de faire?;
    we mean to win nous avons (bien) l'intention de gagner, nous comptons (bien) gagner;
    formal I mean to be obeyed j'entends qu'on m'obéisse;
    formal I mean to see justice done je veux que justice soit faite;
    I meant to tell you about it j'avais l'intention de t'en parler;
    I meant to phone you last night je voulais ou j'avais l'intention de vous téléphoner hier soir;
    I never meant to go je n'ai jamais eu l'intention d'y aller;
    I didn't mean to hurt you je ne voulais pas te faire de mal;
    I only meant to help je voulais seulement me rendre utile;
    I mean to see him now - and I mean now! j'ai l'intention de le voir tout de suite, et quand je dis tout de suite, c'est tout de suite!;
    I didn't mean it! (action) je ne l'ai pas fait exprès!; (words) je n'étais pas sérieux!;
    you annoyed him when you said that - I meant to! il n'a pas apprécié que tu dises ça - c'était bien mon intention!;
    without meaning to involontairement;
    I mean him no harm je ne lui veux pas de mal;
    I meant it as a joke c'était une plaisanterie;
    it was meant as a compliment/an insult c'était censé être un compliment/une insulte;
    that remark was meant for you cette remarque s'adressait à vous;
    that remark wasn't meant to be overheard cette remarque n'était pas censée être entendue;
    the present was meant for your brother le cadeau était destiné à ton frère;
    they're meant for each other ils sont faits l'un pour l'autre;
    what's this switch meant to be for? à quoi est censé servir cet interrupteur?;
    it's meant to be a horse c'est censé représenter un cheval;
    perhaps I was meant to be a doctor peut-être que j'étais fait pour être médecin;
    it was meant to be c'était écrit;
    he means well il a de bonnes intentions;
    he meant well il croyait bien faire
    (g) (consider, believe)
    it's meant to be good for arthritis il paraît que c'est bon pour l'arthrite;
    this painting is meant to be by Rembrandt ce tableau est censé être un Rembrandt
    that box isn't meant to be in here cette boîte n'est pas censée être ici;
    this portrait is meant to be of the duke ce portrait est censé représenter le duc;
    you're meant to bow when she comes in tu dois faire la révérence quand elle entre;
    you weren't meant to open the presents until tomorrow tu n'étais pas censé ouvrir les cadeaux avant demain
    ►► Mathematics mean absolute deviation écart m moyen absolu;
    Mathematics mean deviation écart m moyen;
    mean distance distance f moyenne;
    mean duration durée f moyenne;
    mean price prix m moyen;
    Computing mean time between failures moyenne f de temps entre deux pannes

    Un panorama unique de l'anglais et du français > mean

  • 13 converse

    [kən'vɜ:s] formal converser;
    to converse with sb s'entretenir avec qn
    ['kɒnvɜ:s] (opinion, statement, results) contraire; Mathematics réciproque
    3 noun ['kɒnvɜ:s]
    (a) (gen) contraire m, inverse m;
    I believe the converse to be true je crois que l'inverse est vrai
    (b) Philosophy (proposition f) converse f
    (c) Mathematics (proposition f) réciproque f
    (d) formal or literary conversation f, entretien m;
    to hold converse with sb s'entretenir avec qn

    Un panorama unique de l'anglais et du français > converse

  • 14 Boole, George

    [br]
    b. 2 November 1815 Lincoln, England
    d. 8 December 1864 Ballintemple, Coounty Cork, Ireland
    [br]
    English mathematician whose development of symbolic logic laid the foundations for the operating principles of modern computers.
    [br]
    Boole was the son of a tradesman, from whom he learned the principles of mathematics and optical-component manufacturing. From the early age of 16 he taught in a number of schools in West Yorkshire, and when only 20 he opened his own school in Lincoln. There, at the Mechanical Institute, he avidly read mathematical journals and the works of great mathematicians such as Lagrange, Laplace and Newton and began to tackle a variety of algebraic problems. This led to the publication of a constant stream of original papers in the newly launched Cambridge Mathematical Journal on topics in the fields of algebra and calculus, for which in 1844 he received the Royal Society Medal.
    In 1847 he wrote The Mathematical Analysis of Logic, which applied algebraic symbolism to logical forms, whereby the presence or absence of properties could be represented by binary states and combined, just like normal algebraic equations, to derive logical statements about a series of operations. This laid the foundations for the binary logic used in modern computers, which, being based on binary on-off devices, greatly depend on the use of such operations as "and", "nand" ("not and"), "or" and "nor" ("not or"), etc. Although he lacked any formal degree, this revolutionary work led to his appointment in 1849 to the Chair of Mathematics at Queen's College, Cork, where he continued his work on logic and also produce treatises on differential equations and the calculus of finite differences.
    [br]
    Principal Honours and Distinctions
    Royal Society Medal 1844. FRS 1857.
    Bibliography
    Boole's major contributions to logic available in republished form include George Boole: Investigation of the Laws of Thought, Dover Publications; George Boole: Laws of Thought, Open Court, and George Boole: Studies in Logic \& Probability, Open Court.
    1872, A Treatise on Differential Equations.
    Further Reading
    W.Kneale, 1948, "Boole and the revival of logic", Mind 57:149.
    G.C.Smith (ed.), 1982, George Boole \& Augustus de Morgan. Correspondence 1842– 1864, Oxford University Press.
    —, 1985, George Boole: His Life and Work, McHale.
    E.T.Bell, 1937, Men of Mathematics, London: Victor Gollancz.
    KF

    Biographical history of technology > Boole, George

  • 15 congruence

    congruence ['kɒŋgrʊəns], congruency ['kɒŋgruənsɪ]
    (a) formal (similarity) conformité f
    (b) formal (correspondence) correspondance f; (suitability) convenance f
    (c) Mathematics congruence f

    Un panorama unique de l'anglais et du français > congruence

  • 16 congruent

    congruent ['kɒŋgrʊənt]
    (a) formal (similar) conforme;
    congruent with or to conforme à
    (b) formal (corresponding) en harmonie; (suitable) convenable;
    to be congruent with sth être en harmonie avec qch;
    the sentence is congruent with the crime la peine correspond au crime
    (c) Mathematics (number) congru, congruent; (triangle) congruent

    Un panorama unique de l'anglais et du français > congruent

  • 17 equation

    equation [ɪ'kweɪʒən]
    (a) formal (association) assimilation f;
    the equation of fame with success l'assimilation de la célébrité au succès
    (b) formal (equalization) égalisation f
    (c) Chemistry & Mathematics équation f;
    figurative money doesn't even come into the equation les questions d'argent n'entrent même pas en ligne de compte;
    after their recent good form, the Bullets must come into the equation too il va falloir compter avec les Bullets, qui sont très en forme en ce moment
    ►► Physics equation of state équation f d'état;
    Astronomy equation of time équation f du temps

    Un panorama unique de l'anglais et du français > equation

  • 18 interpolate

    interpolate [ɪn'tɜ:pəleɪt]
    he interpolated several revised passages into the new edition dans la nouvelle édition, il a interpolé plusieurs passages révisés
    (b) formal (interrupt) interrompre;
    "that's utter nonsense", she interpolated "c'est complètement absurde", interrompit-elle
    (c) Mathematics interpoler

    Un panorama unique de l'anglais et du français > interpolate

  • 19 lecture

    I ['lektʃə(r)]
    1) (public talk) lezione f., conferenza f.; BE univ. lezione f.

    to give a lecture — fare una conferenza; BE univ. fare una lezione

    II 1. ['lektʃə(r)]
    1) BE univ. dare lezioni a, fare una lezione a
    2) (scold) fare una ramanzina a, fare la paternale a
    2.
    1) BE univ. dare lezioni, fare una lezione
    2) (give public talk) tenere una conferenza
    * * *
    ['lek ə] 1. noun
    1) (a formal talk given to students or other audiences: a history lecture.) conferenza; lezione
    2) (a long and boring or irritating speech, warning or scolding: The teacher gave the children a lecture for running in the corridor.) ramanzina
    2. verb
    (to give a lecture: He lectures on Roman Art; She lectured him on good behaviour.) fare una conferenza; fare lezione; fare una ramanzina
    * * *
    I ['lektʃə(r)]
    1) (public talk) lezione f., conferenza f.; BE univ. lezione f.

    to give a lecture — fare una conferenza; BE univ. fare una lezione

    II 1. ['lektʃə(r)]
    1) BE univ. dare lezioni a, fare una lezione a
    2) (scold) fare una ramanzina a, fare la paternale a
    2.
    1) BE univ. dare lezioni, fare una lezione
    2) (give public talk) tenere una conferenza

    English-Italian dictionary > lecture

  • 20 let

    Ⅰ.
    let1 [let] (pt & pp let, cont letting)
    1 noun
    (a) (rental) location f;
    she took a six-month let on a house elle a loué une maison pour six mois;
    a short/long let une location de courte/longue durée
    (b) Sport (in tennis, squash) balle f let;
    let! let!;
    the ball was a let la balle était let;
    to play a let jouer une balle let
    without let or hindrance librement, sans entrave
    (a) (rent) louer;
    to let (sign) à louer
    or literary to let (sb's) blood faire une saignée (à qn)
    ►► Sport let ball balle f let
    Ⅱ.
    let2 [let] (pt & pp let, cont letting)
    (a) (permit) laisser, permettre; (allow) laisser;
    to let sb do sth laisser qn faire qch, permettre à qn de faire qch;
    she let them watch the programme elle les a laissés regarder l'émission;
    I couldn't come because my parents wouldn't let me je ne suis pas venu parce que mes parents ne me l'ont pas permis;
    I let the cakes burn j'ai laissé brûler les gâteaux;
    let me buy you all a drink laissez-moi vous offrir un verre;
    don't let me stop you going je ne veux pas t'empêcher d'y aller;
    let me see the newspaper fais-moi voir le journal;
    to let sb past laisser passer qn;
    they don't let anyone near the reactor ils ne laissent personne approcher du réacteur;
    let me tell you that… permettez-moi de vous dire que…;
    it wasn't easy, let me tell you! ça n'a pas été facile, crois-moi!;
    familiar don't let it get you down! ne te laisse pas abattre pour ça!;
    don't let him get to you ne te soucie pas de lui;
    to let sb have sth donner qch à qn;
    don't be selfish, let him have a cake! ne sois pas égoïste, donne-lui un gâteau!;
    I'll let you have a copy of the report je vous ferai parvenir une copie du rapport;
    she let him know what she thought of him elle lui a fait savoir ce qu'elle pensait de lui;
    let me know when he wakes up prévenez-moi quand il se réveillera;
    I'll let him know you're here je vais le prévenir que vous êtes arrivé;
    please let me know if there's any change veuillez me prévenir s'il y a du changement;
    please God don't let anything happen to her! faites qu'il ne lui arrive rien!;
    to let sth pass laisser passer qch;
    familiar to let sb have it (physically) casser la figure à qn; (verbally) dire ses quatre vérités à qn
    (b) (followed by "go")
    to let sb go (allow to leave) laisser partir qn; (release) relâcher qn; (allow to escape) laisser échapper qn; euphemism (dismiss, fire) licencier qn;
    to let sb go, to let go of sb (stop holding) lâcher qn;
    they let the hostages go ils ont relâché les otages;
    she let her assistant go elle a licencié son assistant;
    let me go!, let go of me! lâchez-moi!;
    to let sth go (allow to escape) laisser échapper qch;
    to let sth go, to let go of sth (stop holding) lâcher qch;
    hold the rope and don't let go (of it)! tiens la corde et ne la lâche pas!;
    to let oneself go (neglect oneself, relax) se laisser aller;
    he's really let the garden go il a vraiment négligé le jardin;
    that remark was uncalled-for but I'll let it go cette réflexion était déplacée mais restons-en là;
    give me £5 and we'll let it go at that donne-moi 5 livres et on n'en parle plus
    let's hurry! dépêchons-nous!;
    let's go to bed allons nous coucher;
    let's go! allons-y!;
    don't let's go out or let's not go out tonight ne sortons pas ce soir;
    let's not have an argument about it! on ne va pas se disputer pour ça!;
    now, let's not have any nonsense! allons, pas de bêtises!;
    shall we have a picnic? - yes, let's! si on faisait un pique-nique? - d'accord!;
    formal let us pray prions ensemble
    let me start by saying how pleased I am to be here laissez-moi d'abord vous dire combien je suis ravi d'être ici;
    let me put it another way je vais tâcher d'être plus clair;
    let me try and explain je vais essayer de vous expliquer
    let me think attends, voyons voir;
    let me see, let's see voyons
    if she doesn't want my help, let her do it herself! si elle ne veut pas de mon aide, qu'elle le fasse toute seule!;
    let them talk! laisse-les dire!
    don't let me catch you at it again! que je ne t'y reprenne plus!;
    familiar let me catch you doing that again and you're for it! si je te reprends à faire ça, ça va être ta fête!
    let there be light que la lumière soit;
    let the festivities begin! que la fête commence!;
    let them be! laisse-les tranquilles!, fiche-leur la paix!
    let us suppose that... supposons que...;
    Mathematics let x equal 17 soit x égal à 17;
    Mathematics let ABC be a right-angled triangle soit un triangle rectangle ABC
    I wouldn't go out with him, let alone marry him je ne sortirais même pas avec lui, alors pour ce qui est de l'épouser...;
    he's never even used a computer, let alone surfed the Internet il ne s'est jamais servi d'un ordinateur et encore moins de l'Internet
    to let sb by laisser passer qn
    (a) (disappoint) décevoir;
    to let sb down gently ménager qn;
    I felt really let down j'étais vraiment déçu;
    our old car has never let us down notre vieille voiture ne nous a jamais lâchés;
    he has been badly let down il a été gravement déçu
    (b) (lower, let fall → object) baisser, (faire) descendre; (→ hair) dénouer;
    figurative to let sb down gently traiter qn avec ménagement
    (c) (garment) rallonger;
    to let the hem of a dress down rallonger une robe
    (d) (deflate) dégonfler
    (a) (person, animal) laisser entrer;
    to let sb in ouvrir (la porte) à qn, faire entrer qn;
    his mother let me in sa mère m'a fait entrer ou m'a ouvert (la porte);
    here's the key to let yourself in voici la clé pour entrer;
    she let herself in with a pass key elle est entrée avec un passe
    (b) (air, water) laisser passer;
    the roof lets the rain in le toit laisse entrer ou passer la pluie;
    my shoes let in water mes chaussures prennent l'eau
    to let in the clutch embrayer
    he didn't realize what he was letting himself in for il ne savait pas à quoi il s'engageait;
    we're letting ourselves in for a lot of work nous allons avoir beaucoup de travail
    to let sb in on sth mettre qn au courant de qch;
    have you let him in on the secret? lui avez-vous confié le secret?
    (a) (allow to enter) laisser entrer;
    my mother let her into the flat ma mère l'a laissée entrer dans l'appartement
    I'll let you into a secret je vais te confier un secret
    (c) (insert) encastrer;
    the pipes are let into the wall les tuyaux sont encastrés dans le mur;
    to let a door/window into a wall percer une porte/fenêtre dans un mur
    let off
    (a) (excuse) dispenser;
    to let sb off doing sth dispenser qn de faire qch;
    I've been let off work je suis dispensé de travailler
    (b) (allow to leave) laisser partir; (allow to disembark) laisser descendre;
    we were let off an hour early on nous a laissés partir une heure plus tôt;
    they let us off the bus on nous a laissés descendre du bus
    (c) (criminal, pupil, child) ne pas punir;
    the judge let him off lightly le juge a fait preuve d'indulgence à son égard;
    she was let off with a fine elle s'en est tirée avec une amende;
    I'll let you off this time pour cette fois, je passe;
    you let him off too easily vous n'avez pas été assez sévère avec lui
    (d) (bomb, explosive) faire exploser; (firework) faire partir; (gun) laisser partir
    (e) (release → steam, liquid) laisser échapper;
    figurative to let off steam se défouler
    (f) (rent) louer;
    the whole building is let off as offices tout l'immeuble est loué en bureaux
    let on
    (allow to embark) laisser monter;
    they let us on the train on nous a laissés monter dans le train
    familiar parler ;
    she never let on elle ne l'a jamais dit;
    somebody let on about the wedding to the press quelqu'un a parlé du mariage à ou a révélé le mariage à la presse;
    he didn't let on that he saw her (didn't tell anyone) il n'a pas dit qu'il l'avait vue; (didn't acknowledge her) il a fait semblant de ne pas la voir;
    don't let on! pas un mot!
    let out
    (a) (allow to leave) laisser sortir; (bird) laisser échapper; (prisoner) libérer;
    the teacher let us out early le professeur nous a laissés sortir plus tôt;
    my secretary will let you out ma secrétaire va vous reconduire;
    don't get up, I'll let myself out ne vous levez pas, je connais le chemin
    (b) (water, air) laisser échapper;
    someone's let the air out of the tyres quelqu'un a dégonflé les pneus
    (c) (shout, oath, whistle) laisser échapper
    (d) (secret) révéler;
    who let it out that they're getting married? qui est allé raconter qu'ils allaient se marier?
    (e) (garment) élargir
    to let out the clutch débrayer
    (g) British (rent) louer;
    they let out boats by the hour ils louent des bateaux à l'heure
    American (end) finir
    (a) (stop) arrêter; (diminish) diminuer;
    the rain didn't let up all day il n'a pas cessé ou arrêté de pleuvoir de toute la journée;
    once he's started he never lets up une fois lancé, il ne s'arrête plus
    he never lets up il ne s'accorde aucun répit;
    don't let up now, you're in the lead ce n'est pas le moment de faiblir, tu es en tête
    to let up on sb lâcher la bride à qn

    Un panorama unique de l'anglais et du français > let

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